Pressure tubes: The heart of the reactor
CNSC issues regulatory action to all nuclear power plant licensees, and orders to Bruce Power and Ontario Power Generation
On July 13, 2021, the CNSC issued formal notices to all nuclear power plant licensees in Canada, requesting further analysis on the continued safe operation of pressure tubes. This was due to Bruce Power finding elevated levels of hydrogen equivalent (Heq) in the pressure tubes of two units that are currently shutdown.
Following this regulatory action, on July 26, our staff issued an order to Bruce Power, and on July 27, an order to Ontario Power Generation (OPG), to ensure that any units currently offline at the Bruce, Pickering and Darlington Nuclear Generating Stations, along with any other reactors that go offline at these sites going forward, are not restarted until the Commission authorizes them to do so.
All of these issuances were done out of abundance of caution, and we do not see this as a safety issue.
For more information on pressure tubes and how we ensure their safety, see below.
Inside all CANDU nuclear power reactors in Canada are several hundred fuel channels. Each fuel channel has one pressure tube, one calandria tube, end fittings and spacers.
Pressure tubes are the heart of the reactor. They are designed to contain the fuel bundles and the primary coolant (water) in a reactor.
During regular nuclear power plant operation, pressure tubes are exposed to high temperatures, high pressure and intense radiation, which can cause them to deteriorate. Much like with any machine, over time, nuclear reactor parts need to be tested, serviced and replaced.
The CNSC licenses nuclear power plant operators, who are required to regularly monitor the condition of pressure tubes to ensure they meet operational fitness standards. Key issues to watch for in pressure tubes are subtle changes in shape, state of material properties and appearance of flaws. These issues are monitored through periodic inspections and assessments by the licensee, followed by an independent review by the CNSC.
Although pressure tubes were deliberately designed to withstand operational wear and tear, they do age over time. And so, aging management programs for pressure tubes are essential to the ongoing safe operation of nuclear power plants.
Through extensive research, testing and modeling development, licensees must understand the impact of ageing on pressure tubes.
Licensees must perform inspections and demonstrate to the satisfaction of the CNSC that pressure tubes are able to continue to operate safely into the future. Every two to three years, inspections on pressure tubes are carried out. Inspection results are used by the licensees to conduct extensive modeling and prediction of the fitness for service of pressure tubes. Licensees must provide the CNSC with their periodic inspection plans.
The CNSC, as nuclear regulator in Canada, ensures comprehensive and rigorous oversight. CNSC staff analyse and evaluate the data provided by the licensee to confirm pressure tubes meet operational standards.
How staff assess the safety of pressure tubes
Our staff are experts in various technical fields. They review and analyze data to draw their own conclusions on the current and projected safety of pressure tubes. If there is ever any question or outlying data, staff formally request the operator (our licensee) to conduct further sampling work and/or impose a unit maintenance outage to inspect or replace pressure tubes in order to continue operating safely. One such case occurred in 2019 when we requested Bruce Power to take an additional outage to perform pressure tube inspection and maintenance for Unit 6, to ensure safe operation until the shutdown for the refurbishment outage in 2020.
Before staff make any licensing recommendations to the independent Commission, they make various requests to the licensee to validate the accuracy of the data presented from sampling pressure tubes.
How the independent Commission makes a licensing decision on the safety of pressure tubes
Only when staff are satisfied with the data, predictive modelling and full scope of licensing, including all safety and control areas, do they make a consolidated recommendation to the Commission in a Commission member document (CMD). This information, along with information presented from the licensee, and intervenors, is thoroughly reviewed by each Commission member and then deliberated upon before issuing a licensing decision.
How we ensure that pressure tubes are safe to operate
We require licensees to conduct regular pressure tube inspections. The data from these inspections is analyzed using various techniques to confirm the tubes are safe to operate for the conditions they were designed for.
During operation, flaws can form in the tubes because of contact with the fuel bundles or contact between the pressure tube and the calandria tube. The material will also undergo changes because of irradiation, exposure to the heavy water used to cool the fuel, and the absorption of deuterium (heavy hydrogen acquired from normal operation). These changes are expected as the result of aging of the pressure tubes from normal operation. Licensees must confirm that aged tubes continue to meet the required safety margins specified in the design documents and industry standards.
Licensees have technical experts who dedicate countless hours to reviewing and analyzing hundreds of data points using complex equations and predictive modelling to validate the integrity of pressure tubes. This work ensures that the pressure tubes continue to meet the required safety margins and that pressure tubes are aging in a predictable manner. Licensees are required to test pressure tubes periodically to collect new data for these evaluations.
Licensees develop their own strategies, reviewed and approved by the CNSC, to evaluate the fitness for service of pressure tubes for the duration of their operational life. Evaluations are typically completed 2 to 3 years depending on a reactor’s outage schedule. The evaluations are updated following each outage and more frequently if new information is obtained from research or regular operational activities that would affect the conclusions of an existing evaluation.
If a licensee determines that any pressure tubes cannot meet safety margins beyond a certain point in time, corrective actions must be taken before that time is reached. Such actions could include more frequent inspections, removing the fuel bundles from some channels, limiting the maximum power output of a reactor, replacing channels or, if necessary, shutting down the reactor. The specific corrective actions selected will depend on the finding’s potential risk to the safe operation of the pressure tubes.
The Commission will not permit licensees to operate tubes that do not meet the required safety margins. There is a dedicated team of CNSC specialists and project officers who monitor the licensee’s activities related to pressure tube inspections and evaluations and provide updates to the Commission.
Pressure tube inspections
Pressure tube evaluations are generally divided into two categories:
- Evaluations for inspected pressure tubes
- Risk assessments to extrapolate the findings from inspected pressure tubes to make judgements about the condition of the entire population of tubes in a reactor core
Inspection programs attempt to identify tubes that are mostly likely to be susceptible to various forms of degradation. The evaluation of the inspection results for those tubes are considered representative of the uninspected population of tubes and evaluations are carried out by extrapolating findings from the inspected pressure tubes to assess the likelihood of failure in the uninspected population. These evaluations are also used to determine if the sample of the tubes that are selected for inspection need to be increased as the pressure tubes continue to age.
In general, at least 30% of the pressure tubes in a reactor core will undergo inspection during the lifetime of a reactor to assess the tube’s condition. The inspection scope for all reactor units currently exceeds the minimum periodic inspection program requirements established in CSA standard N285.4, which establishes the requirements for inspecting nuclear piping, pressure vessels and related components.
Fitness-for-service programs are comprised of four key required elements:
- Licensee demonstration of an understanding of the degradation mechanisms that potentially impact pressure tubes. Sources of information include research activities and operating experience
- Implementation of plans for research, inspection and examination of pressure tubes to adequately manage potential degradation mechanisms
- Inspections throughout the reactor’s operating life, and periodic removal of pressure tubes from service for examination
- CNSC staff evaluation of results of monitoring activities, to confirm that required design and fitness-for-service safety margins are maintained; the results of these evaluations are also used to verify that the current understanding of the degradation mechanisms is correct
These 4 elements form a continuous feedback loop between the licensee and the CNSC throughout the operating life of the pressure tubes.
CNSC staff evaluate the overall program and accept it if it meets requirements. CNSC staff actively monitor licensee activities to ensure that compliance verification criteria are met.
After every inspection campaign, inspected pressure tubes must be evaluated against compliance verification criteria to demonstrate that the tube will meet the established safety margins until at least the next planned inspection or, in some cases, the expected end of life.
For extended operation, licensees often state a maximum period of time expressed in equivalent full-power hours for pressure tube operation. For example, Darlington units are licensed to 235,000 equivalent full-power hours and Bruce Power units are licensed to 300,000 equivalent full-power hours. These limits only apply to pressure tubes that satisfy all fitness-for-service compliance verification criteria up to those limits. Through the execution of the fitness-for-service strategy, if it is determined that any tubes will not maintain the required safety margins up to the licensing limit, corrective actions will be required. As previously mentioned, this could include the following:
- Enhanced inspection activities to obtain data to improve evaluations
- Defuelling of channels to reduce degradation rates
- Replacement of pressure tubes that cannot meet required safety margins
Regardless of the length of the licence period for a given station, it is not permitted to operate pressure tubes that do not meet safety margins established in the compliance verification criteria. If corrective actions to resolve issues will not be effective or are impossible to implement, a reactor has to be shut down prior to the maximum operating limit specified in the licence.
- Commission decision on OPG Pickering Unit 5 restart
- Commission decision on Bruce Unit 3 restart
- External Advisory Committee on Pressure Tubes
- Ontario Power Generation: Application to Renew the Licence to Prepare Site for the Darlington New Nuclear Project (DNNP)
- The CNSC’s response to the Globe and Mail related to pressure tubes
- The CNSC’s response to the Clean Air Alliance related to pressure tubes
- Remarks by President Rumina Velshi on recent public questions about pressure tubes at the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station
- Video of the remarks by President Rumina Velshi at the April 27, 2021 public Commission meeting
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